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ABSTRACT
The article analyses the constitution of subjectivity in Ruben 
Östlund’s film Force Majeure (2014). At the centre of attention 
stands the male protagonist who is uncapable of reconciling his 
inner nature with the external expectations. If the film may be un-
derstood as a critique of existing middle-class conventions, it also 
reproduces a highly conventional ideal of the self-identical subject. 
The article argues that this confusion or irony is an expression of a 
Cartesian subject – still prevalent in the film – in crisis. A neglected 
aspect of Descartes’ theory is that the autonomy of the subjects 
presupposes the existence of God. The problem for Östlund’s char-
acters is that there is no God. Still, they act as if he, or as if any au-
thority might, legitimize their subjectivity. Thus, the whole existence 
becomes a series of performances. The idea of an inner nature cor-
responds with the notion of an outer nature. The latter is certainly 
very present in Force Majeure, but at the same time this nature is 
constantly problematized. On an allegorical level, the film may thus 
be read as a comment on the Anthropocene, a state where we no 
longer know neither what “nature”, nor “culture” is. 
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I
In a talk show on Swedish Public Service Radio in 2017, Ruben 
Östlund discussed a scene in his, at that time, forthcoming film 
The Square. In the scene, a disconcerting art performance is 
taking place during an elegant gala banquet. A performance artist 
is acting like a wild animal, a monkey, or, as Östlund puts it, “a 
human being who has been stripped of his civilized veneer. What 
remains is just instincts and drives.”1 More concretely, the bare-
chested artist jumps around between the dressed-up dinner guests 
like a big ape. Sniffing, tinkering, investigating – acting like a wild 
animal might act, scaring the dinner guests, chasing a man out 
of the room, before taking an interest in a woman. Gradually he 
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initiates a sexual assault on her. Despite her half-hearted cries for 
help, no one does anything, until finally, at the last moment, a few 
men rush up and furiously overpower the “monkey”, drowning him 
with punches while shouting about killing him.
To Östlund, this scene illustrates a conflict between nature and 
culture, instincts and civilized manners. The human being, Östlund 
explains, is governed by instincts and drives at the same time as it 
is forced to act according to certain cultural roles, roles that are 
mediated by mass media and cultural products of different kinds. 
The result is discomfort, shame, and awkwardness of various 
degrees. This is a conflict that can be observed in several of Östlund’s 
films, not least in Force Majeure (2014), which will be the focus of 
attention here. This film revolves around a family (Tomas, Ebba, 
and their two children) on a ski vacation in the Alps. In the central 
scene, the family is having lunch on the terrace of a restaurant 
when an avalanche, triggered intentionally, approaches from the 
opposite mountainside. Tomas assures his worried wife that they 
are safe, that everything is under control. When the avalanche 
does not stop, but instead seems to threaten the restaurant and the 
panic is spreading, it is nevertheless he who rushes up and escapes, 
leaving his family to fend for themselves. 
Just a few weeks before Östlund’s radio talk, the former Swedish 
Minister of Finance, Anders Borg, issued a public apology for 
making a fool of himself at a private party. According to reports 
in the media, Borg, being very drunk, had acted aggressively 
towards other guests, calling a number of women “whores,” 
grabbing male guests in the crotch, and displaying his own genitals. 
When the rumours reached the press, Borg made an excuse on his 
Facebook profile: “I have heard, in retrospect, that I acted very 
inappropriately,” he wrote, “I sincerely want to apologize to the 
people present who took offense. Feel great disappointment and 
repentance for my behaviour.”2 
The reason for bringing up Anders Borg here is that his 
behaviour – above all his excuse – was an interesting echo of the 
behaviour of Tomas in Force Majeure. If the avalanche scene is the 
peripeteia of the film, there is a second turning point when Tomas 
finally, after stubbornly having denied his spineless escape, breaks 
down and confesses – we could call this the crying scene. Trying 
to make sense of his actions, he starts talking about himself as two 
persons: “I get it that you’re disappointed in the person who has 
materialized,” he says to his wife, as if this “person” was someone 
else. “I’m really disappointed in him too. I hate him.”3 (1:34:35). He 
then starts to weep for real, unable to control his body, sobbing “like 
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a child struck by emotions,” as it says in the published script.4 “I’m 
a victim too! I’m a bloody victim of my own instincts!” (1:35:27).
What we have here, is the same divided subject as in the Borg 
case – a reflecting self and its instincts. A man who is disappointed 
(the phrase used by Borg is almost the same as Tomas’) in himself, 
in his own actions. What is noteworthy, is that both characters 
deprive the self of the responsibility for the actions that it 
simultaneously admits to have performed. Borg apologizes and 
throws the blame away at the same time: he had a “black out,” and 
he feels “disappointment.” In exactly the same way, Tomas’ excuse 
implies that he should get away with his actions. Instead of taking 
responsibility, he treats himself as a victim of his instincts. Just like 
Borg, he is disappointed, “disappointed in him,” as if there were 
two persons without influence on each other. 
Perhaps this could be described as a new kind of subjective 
impotence: successful men in their prime, who suddenly cannot 
account for themselves and their actions5 – the case with the 
Swedish minister of finance, being a good non-fictive example. 
(If one wants more examples, the #metoo campaign, and the 
explanations and excuses generated by it, is a good place to look.) 
It is as if we are gradually becoming some kind of extras in our own 
lives, as if we are alien in relation to our own behaviour. 
In order to analyse this further, one could of course turn to 
Freud, his dissection of the human subject, the invention of the 
unconscious, and the observation of an ego that is no longer a master 
in its own house.6 This is not the way taken by Östlund though. If we 
regard Force Majeure as an investigation, a case of artistic research 
in subjective shortcomings, it does not enter into the realm of the 
unconscious, dreams, and repressed sexuality. Of course, one may 
still go ahead and “read” the film from that perspective, but that 
is not the route I am taking here. The reason for this is that I am 
interested not only in “Tomas” as a symptom, but also in the model 
of thinking, adopted by Östlund, the ideological matrix reproduced 
by Force Majeure. Not because it is original, but on the contrary, 
because I think his model of thinking is typical for our times. 
According to this ideology, the cultural roles we play should 
be in accordance with our inner nature (men should be men, self-
identity is what we should strive for, and beneath all culture we 
find nature, which consists of instincts, desire, animalism…). 
When Östlund himself talks about his films, this impression is 
actually strengthened.7 This aspect is also highlighted, time and 
time again, in the reception of Force Majeure.8 It is hence not 
farfetched to argue that this is an explanation for its success: the 
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film lets us laugh at the middle-class behaviour (i.e. at ourselves), 
at the same time as it confirms, rather than threatens, the ideology 
and the understanding of subjectivity on which this behaviour (our 
behaviour) relies. This is an ideology that, in short, confirms the 
individual as a natural entity – that is, something stable, something 
that is just there – and discards all political aspects and explanations 
as secondary.
This understanding has arguably gained impact during the 
last decades, partly due to advances in the natural sciences. The 
human genome has been mapped out, the biochemical premises 
for our feelings have been more and more well documented; the 
diagnoses that define our personal peculiarities are proliferating. 
Now, more than ever, we are able to explain biologically what lies 
behind the actions and feelings of the subject, and hence do away 
with the unwanted sides of life. Even death may be pushed into a far 
future. However, the more knowledge we gain about the biological 
premises of our human behaviour, the more powerless the human 
subjects become; the agency no longer resides in me or “Tomas” 
or “Anders,” but in our genes and nervous system, in the smallest 
constituents of our brain cells. The subjects thus turn into objects. 
In a way this implies that we can no longer be held responsible for 
our own actions, because they are grounded on a molecular level. 
We can hardly even feel ashamed – just like Tomas and Anders, we 
can only feel what we feel after a bad concert or a mediocre dinner: 
disappointment.  
Against that background it might be wrong to describe the 
“subjective impotence” depicted in Force Majeure as a new 
phenomenon. The impotence is simply a part of what it means to 
be a human being of flesh and blood, and hence not new at all. 
What is new is rather the political and ethical expectations on the 
subject, connected with a neoliberal ethos and an economization 
of the subject. “As human capital, the subject is at once in charge 
of itself, responsible for itself, yet an instrumentalizable and 
potentially dispensable element of the whole,” as Wendy Brown 
puts it.9 If there is no such thing as society, not even a people, no 
“demos,” the autonomous subject is left on its own. Subjective 
freedom hence coincides with unbearable responsibility. As 
Theodor Adorno writes half a century earlier: “The more freedom 
the subject – and the community of subjects – ascribes to itself, the 
greater its responsibility; and before this responsibility it must fail 
in a bourgeois life which in practice has never yet endowed a subject 
with the unabridged autonomy accorded to it in theory. Hence the 
subject must feel guilty.”10 If this was discernible already in the 
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1960s, the point here is that this tendency has only been amplified 
ever since. Today the individual subject should not only be able to 
narrate its own story, to create itself according to its own will, but 
also to solve all the problems that are exterior to it: refugee crises, 
segregation, domestic violence, climate change, etc. The subject 
has become powerless and omnipotent at the same time. This is, I 
would argue, the predicament of the subjects in Force Majeure, and 
the background to the disappointment expressed by both Tomas 
and Anders Borg.
But let us linger for a while on the idea of a split subject, a 
subject that is both natural and cultural, that is torn between 
instincts and conventional demands. Where does this idea come 
from? One might point to Rousseau’s ideas of a state of nature; to 
Vico’s distinction between God’s knowledge (of Nature) and human 
knowledge (of civil institutions), giving rise to natural sciences and 
the humanities as the two forms of knowledge corresponding to 
them; to the Christian idea of a flesh that is weak and a soul that 
should be saved; to Plato’s distinction between the idea and the 
matter; and so on. The line could be drawn very far back in history. 
More important in this context, however, is René Descartes. 
In his Discourse on Method, in reflecting upon his own subject, he 
concludes that “this ‘I,’ that is to say, the mind, by which I am what 
I am, is entirely distinct from the body.”11 If Descartes, at least 
according to the schoolbook version, inaugurates the autonomous, 
modern subject, he simultaneously splits this subject in two. The 
mind is totally alienated from the flesh. Or as he puts it a few pages 
further ahead in the text: “intelligent nature is distinct from the 
corporeal.”12 
This is the matrix not only for the subject painted in Force Majeure 
(the civilized and successful husband, a victim to his own instincts), 
but also for Östlund’s own explanations and interpretations. In 
commenting on his films, he reproduces this distinction over and 
over again. And yet it is not that easy to say where he is going with 
this. Take for example the scene where Tomas is skiing off-piste 
with his macho friend Mats. It is after the avalanche scene, but 
before the crying scene; in other words, Tomas is in limbo, a state 
of denial. They climb a mountain while talking about feelings. At 
the top Mats suggests that Tomas should try to scream. Scream out 
loud; let everything go in a primal scream, the idea being that inner 
nature should be released while being out there in the wilderness, 
far away from all culture. Tomas tries, hesitatingly at first, but then 
really puts himself in to it, crying out desperately. 
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As so often in Östlund’s films, there is something unclear regarding 
how this scene wants to be understood.13 Notwithstanding all the 
statements about our inner nature being at odds with the conventions 
(“wild and uncivilized nature”, “What remains is just instincts and 
drives”), there is something vaguely sarcastic about this scene.14 
Is not Tomas more conventional, more distanced from nature than 
ever, when he obeys the cheesiest of lifestyle advice? And is not 
this what the scene tries to tell us? In other words, it is as if the film 
makes fun of the ideology that it itself adheres to. 
Another example is an enigmatic, short, wordless sequence in 
which a number of aggressive men suddenly are running toward 
Tomas, who tries but fails to escape. In the next shot he is standing 
in what appears to be a night club, in the middle of a group of 
screaming, jumping, puking, half naked men, pouring beer on each 
other. These scenes have no connection to the plot; the sequence 
is like a short eruption of testosterone or “male nature” bursting 
forth, confirming the most commonplace idea of “masculinity.” 
Christian Gullette, who in his dissertation focuses on the queerness 
in Östlund’s films, describes it as “one of the film’s most ironic 
moments.”15 From that perspective, the viewer is invited to laugh 
at the hypermasculine cliché. This might be a plausible reading, but 
it is nevertheless hard to make sense of these scenes. As Gullette 
writes, it is “difficult to tease out exactly how queerness, to varying 
degrees, either deconstructs or recuperates masculine norms, or 
leaves the question unanswered and ambiguous.”16 
This ambiguity is, I would argue, present throughout the film: 
on the one hand, nature is treated as something that still subsists 
within us, at least within “us” men. Every now and then it bursts 
forth, like when the husband instinctively escapes the threatening 
avalanche. On the other hand, the idea of such a nature is painted as 
a ridiculous cliché. It is as if the film wants to say something about 
masculinity, male identity, and nature; but it does not know what 
to say. (Is “male nature” a laughable cliché or is it what Swedish 
men need to recuperate?). It just throws up the cards in the air and 
hopes for the best. 
Hence, another possibility slowly appears: Regardless of 
Östlund’s intention, Force Majeure is a film lamenting or struggling 
with the absence of nature. This is the real reason for Tomas’ angst: 
not that he is a victim to his inner nature, but that he is a simulacrum 
like all the rest of us. Underneath the cultural veneer there is just 
more veneer. When he tries to get in contact with his inner nature – 
through the primal scream, or when he fakes crying, just as when he 
cries for real – he is more conventional than ever, just like Anders 
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Borg was giving in to cultural stereotypes and sexist clichés – rather 
than to inner instincts – when he exposed his genitals.
In this perspective, the crucial question of the film can be 
formulated a bit differently: How can one be real or true or genuine 
when there is no nature anymore? What becomes of the realistic 
film character when there is no “reality” below the surface? When 
there are only roles, images, conventions, with nothing underneath 
them? What is left of the Cartesian subject when it has lost track of 
its own inner nature?
II
If we are to take Östlund’s Cartesianism seriously, we should bear 
in mind that there is another, often foreseen, instance or authority 
involved outside of the split subject. In the fourth meditation, 
Descartes writes: “there must of necessity be another more perfect 
[being], upon whom I depended, and from whom I had acquired 
all I had.”17 To Descartes, this being is God: “that the things we 
grasp very clearly and very distinctly are all true, is assured only 
because God is or exists, and because he is a perfect Being, and 
because everything that is in us comes from him.”18 Even if my 
subjective existence is confirmed by my own thoughts (“cogito…”), 
it is God who makes my thoughts and my body possible, it is God 
who makes things hang together. Without God there would be no 
Cartesian subject. (It might thus be debated how modern the subject 
established by Descartes really is. Étienne Balibar certainly has a 
point, when he argues that when Descartes is said to inaugurate the 
modern subject, it is actually because the later Kantian subject is 
projected onto his text).19 
Another turn of this argument would be to question the presumed 
autonomy of the modern subject. This is in a way what Östlund’s 
film does – as we have seen, the subjects are not in control. Is there 
something like a God in Force Majeure then? Something that can 
give unity to the miserable, powerless subjects? No, no God. That 
is the root of the problem. But maybe there is something that fills 
the same function. The thing is, that most actions in the film are 
performed as if they were to be watched or judged by someone. In 
the very first scene, the family is being photographed. After some 
instructions from the photographer, they succeed in performing 
the happy family in front of the camera. (The scene may be seen 
as an allusion to the first scene in Ingmar Bergman’s Scenes from 
a Marriage, which starts in the same way with the family trying to 
perform their happiness in front of a photographer.20 It is just that 
the willingness to perform, to follow the instructions, is so much 
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stronger four decades later). This actually sets the tone of the whole 
film, and it is as if the characters – above all Tomas – throughout 
the film are busy trying to act as themselves, to play their roles 
convincingly. As if the aim of the whole vacation is to stage the 
happy family life, to live up to the idea of the family in a platonic 
sense, to become authentic, i.e. natural. That quite a few scenes 
take place in front of the bathroom mirror at the hotel is significant; 
the family becomes real to itself only when the members are able to 
watch the image of themselves together. 
This is, one might argue, what bourgeois subjectivity has 
always been about (and hence, as stated above, Östlund’s “critique” 
is a commonplace). Everyone is forced to perform his or her own 
persona, play his or her role – that is modernity for you.21 But if we 
stick to the Cartesian perspective, the light becomes a bit different. 
The subjective existence is necessarily conditioned by a higher 
instance, something that confirms its actions from outside. We 
may not understand ourselves as Cartesians anymore, but maybe 
we still are to a great extent.22 At least if we are to believe Östlund’s 
films, and all his statements about his films, the self-understanding 
of the contemporary (Swedish) middle-class subject is structured 
in that way. This implies not only a distinction between cultural 
role and inner nature, but also this gaze from above. The subjective 
performances are always directed to God, even though he has long 
since died. “God” may hence be understood as a metalevel, an 
existence of another order, an order that is simply necessary for 
the subjective performances to be meaningful at all. 
This becomes more concrete in a scene where Tomas and 
Ebba use the corridor to discuss their issue without the children. A 
caretaker at the hotel is silently watching them from a floor above 
while smoking a cigarette. Annoyed by his presence Ebba confronts 
him: “Can we have some privacy?” (A strange request, given that 
their private room is on the other side of the door). Tomas adds: 
“What do you want?!” (35:31). This question is interesting, because 
it actually makes a lot of sense in relation to the Cartesian matrix. 
The one who asks the question is the subject who cannot cope with 
himself, who feels like a victim of his own instincts. Hence, he asks 
the instance above him (God): what do you want with me? Why am 
I acting like this? Why do you do this to me? Seen in this way, it is 
the premodern subjectus, turning to his Father, asking why this is 
happening to him. But there is no answer, only silence. “God” puts 
his cigarette out and walks away. The subjectus is left to himself. 
In contrast to Descartes (whose cogito was merely a function of 
Gods universe, a helpless effect of God’s will), Tomas is living in a 
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God-forsaken modern world; he has to establish his own existence. 
But he fails, since he cannot find anything real or true in his own 
subjective existence, and neither can he live up to the conventional 
expectations. So, he falls apart. The cogito trick does not work.
But Tomas and Ebba struggle to find a solution. If there is no 
God, maybe something else – basically any subject – can confirm 
them? Maybe the important thing is the transcendent gaze, a gaze 
from above or outside? On the last day of skiing, as the family is 
out on the slopes together, they make a try. As a real father figure 
Tomas is taking the lead, the children following him. What takes 
place now, we realize afterwards, is another enactment, where the 
apparent intention is to rehabilitate Tomas as a husband, father, and 
male. The weather is very foggy, and suddenly Ebba is no longer 
with them. They wait and shout her name. A faint answer from 
far away can be heard. Tomas gets rid of his skis and runs uphill. 
The camera stays with the children. After a rather long time Tomas 
slowly appears again through the fog, now carrying Ebba in his 
arms. When they reach the children, he puts her down on her feet 
and they all hug. And then – which of course discloses the whole 
enactment – she has to return up the hill (apparently not hurt at all) 
to fetch her skis that were left behind. In this scene, the observers 
are the children, who watch Tomas “saving” his wife. No matter if 
they see through the parent’s theatrical act or not, the enactment 
is meaningful as long as they do not object but play their role and 
observe Tomas in action. There is no God, but any gaze might do 
– that is the plan, at least – in order to reinstall the responsible, 
accountable, consistent subject.
In the very last scene of the film, this logic is taken to another 
level. The scene takes place on a bus driving down the narrow 
mountain roads. The vacation is over, everyone is on their way home. 
But the ride does not go as planned. In one of the sharp curves the 
bus is on the verge of running off the road. When attempting to back 
off from the cliff, the incompetent driver fails making the gearshift 
with the result that the bus runs forward instead of backwards, even 
closer to the abyss. Ebba panics, and after some turmoil everyone 
(except one woman) leaves the bus, which then continues down the 
curvy mountain road. The abandoned passengers start walking. 
How should this scene be read? In his ethical reading of Force 
Majeure, Jakob Lothe argues that the last scene is reconciliatory 
and positive.23 But is it really? As a part of the plot it is, once again, 
indeed illogical (Where are they walking? Why do they not call for 
help? How come they left their luggage on the bus?). So why is the 
scene there at all?
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The answer might be twofold. Firstly, the scene is there to create a 
certain balance: Ebba’s escape from the bus is a parallel to Tomas’ 
escape from the avalanche. In other words, the scene demonstrates 
that she is a victim to her instincts too, egoistically leaving her 
children behind on the bus. In that sense, the scene contributes to the 
rehabilitation of the male figure that has been ridiculed throughout 
the film. In the end, he is not the only subject acting instinctively 
selfish. So, after having ridiculed masculinity throughout the film, 
Östlund finally helps him up, basically saying that women are just 
as bad.
Secondly, and more importantly, the bus scene is there to 
generate the final image: everyone walking together toward the 
camera, as a collective. Fig 1
Even though the bus did not crash, this image certainly has the 
feel of “after the disaster.” However, looking closer the people 
walking toward the camera do not really look like ski tourists, nor 
like near victims of a traffic accident, either in how they are dressed 
or in how they act. There is something in the image reminiscent of 
refugees walking away from a war or a flood or a terrorist attack 
– a child is being carried, everyone is serious, as if they escaped 
from a threat and are now walking toward an unpredictable future – 
only this time, it is “us” (white middle-class Europeans) not “them” 
(African or Syrian refugees) who are on the run. 
At the same time, they all seem relaxed. Serious, but content. 
Cool. It is as if they had reached a truer relation with their own 
selves. More in tune. Reconciled, to use Lothe’s word. As Roger 
Edholm points out in his article in this issue, the music in the scene 
stands out from the frenetic Vivaldi score in the rest of the film.24 
First there is silence, and then, at the very end, a more harmonious 
score is slowly building up, creating an almost sacred atmosphere. 
Coolness, harmony, togetherness – the result is something 
reminiscent of a commercial trying to sell us jeans, cigarettes, or 
pension funds. 
In that sense, this scene is a type of enactment too, but at another 
level. This time, it is directed not to some of the characters in the 
film, but to us, the viewers. It is we who should be impressed and 
convinced, we who should confirm the actions and authenticity of 
the subjects walking toward the camera. What then does the scene 
want to tell us? What is it that we should confirm? In short, all 
the identities and units that were threatened: the family, the male 
identity, the authentic middleclass guy, social community, ethics, 
humanity. Here they are, all restored by our gaze. 










But does it work? As long as we stay within the frames of the 
middle-class ethics that is depicted, maybe it does. Put differently, 
the ending is reconciliatory in the same way as commercials 
are. But even the fictive characters themselves know that it is all 
fake, that this ethics can only be upheld through phony charades. 
And just as unlikely as it is that the children do not see through 
the ski slope charade described above, just as hard is it to accept 
the reconciliation of the final shot. Is there not in fact something 
strange, almost scary, about the subjects walking toward us? It is 
getting dark, everything is a bit grey. The people approaching the 
camera appear like a pack rather than a collective, walking one 
by one rather than together. They are almost silent, serious, but 
also lost, out of context, not in touch. It is almost as if they were 
sleepwalking. Is there not something in this shot reminiscent of 
another genre? Fig 2
The similarity to zombie films is not really as long a shot as 
it might appear. At least according to Timothy Morton, there is a 
connection between the zombie and the Cartesian subject: “There is 
an experiential valley where beings such as zombies live in between 
peaks: we ‘healthy’ humans live on one peak, and all the cuter 
robots on the other. Zombies live in the uncanny valley because 
they ironically embody Cartesian dualism: they are animated 
corpses. They are ‘reduced’ to object status.”25 What remains 
of the Cartesian subject in a God forsaken world? An animated 
corpse, trying to perform individuality and life. And animated 
corpses are just what Tomas and his pack are. In the last scene this 
finally becomes evident, both to them and us. Without a God, there 
is nothing that can keep them together, neither as a group nor us 
individual subjects. They are walking dead.
III
If what has been said so far mainly concerns the relation to 
something that could be designated “inner nature,” it is also the 
case that Force Majeure, in it is entirety, is being played out with 
“outer nature” as a recurring background. One could even say that 
this outer nature is the real protagonist of the film, manifesting 
itself through mountains, forests, avalanches, sunshine, fog, 
snowfall, etc. Just like the classic Western movies had to present, 
or construct, the American nature as the silent background of the 
plots in order to tell the story of the conquering of the Wild West, 
Force Majeure tells the story of the Alps – the natural conditions for 
the characters being where they are. 
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There is a logic in this, a correspondence: the idea of an inner 
nature implies that there is also an outer nature from which the 
subject is distant, a context in which his cultural existence might 
take place. The image of an outer nature is hence another aspect 
of the ideology the film pertains to. More precisely, the notion of 
a nature “out there” (outside of culture) and “deep down” (inside 
the subject) are both part of what Timothy Morton calls an age-
old agrilogistic apparatus. “What we call modern dualism (the 
Cartesian self, even better, the transcendental Kantian subject) is 
just a variant of the agrilogistic attunement.”26 One might even 
argue that it is only lately that the falseness of this dualism – this 
“daft idea” to use Morton’s words – is becoming apparent as a 
consequence of what goes under the name of the Anthropocene. 
Nature is suddenly threatening us, but at the same time we realize 
that this is a “nature” brought forth by us, by human culture, 
modernity, progress, domination of nature. 
This historic irony is something the film actually brings 
attention to, through recurring shots of the piste machines, the 
snow-making machines, the mechanisms of the cableways, the 
controlled avalanches, the sophisticated architecture of the hotel, 
the mountain-top restaurants, and so on. If this is “nature,” the 
film tells us, it is also a cultural product, something man made, a 
commodity.27 In order to spend time in nature, we have transformed 
it into something else. 
Following Adorno, one could say that the film thus says 
nothing at all about nature, but quite a lot about “second nature”: 
”The concept of a second nature remains the negation of whatever 
might be thought of as a first nature. So, it does not represent the 
recurrence of a nature, that has been suppressed and is now being 
restored, but on the contrary it is the totality of whatever has been 
so completely trapped by social and rational mechanisms … that 
nothing differing from it can manifest itself.”28 Second nature has 
such a total grip over us that there can no longer be anything that 
exceeds it, Adorno argues. If there is such a thing as (first) nature, 
we do not have any access to it, because we are not capable of 
reaching out of second nature. “[W]hat seems to be outside us is 
in reality not outside at all,” as Adorno writes.29 The distinction 
between nature and culture, ascribing the first one an untouched 
priority, does not hold – it is the result of the subject projecting 
itself onto nature – which means that the whole notion of “inside” / 
“outside” also breaks down, just like Morton argues.
But even if this is the case, it is certainly becoming clearer that 
there is something beyond our cultural constructions, subjective 
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perspectives, and ideological confinements. The temperature is 
rising, the ice is melting, species are dying. Nature? Well, whatever 
we want to call it, what appeared to be the passive, stable counterpart 
of culture and history, is all of a sudden delicate, unstable, active, 
and just as much culture as nature. This is one way to understand 
the Anthropocene: as a historical state of nature undeniably 
brought forth by us – or rather by agrilogistics, capitalism, 
progress, technology, humanity – at the same time as it exceeds our 
intentions, interpretations, and possibilities to do much about it.30 
This implies that not only the relation between history and nature 
has to be rethought,31 but also the understanding of human agency. 
What we are facing is something beyond our control, produced by 
our control. Is it perhaps rather culture that is a product of nature? 
Is “culture” just an anthropocentric misunderstanding?
Intentionally or unintentionally, Force Majeure contains an 
allegorical dimension mediating this confusion typical to the 
Anthropocene. Who are we? What are we made of? What is 
acting when we think we are acting? What is that, which we called 
nature? Or the culture we thought we were? These categories are 
certainly hard to keep separate. And accordingly, the “we” is not 
as autonomous as we, from our Cartesian perspective, imagined. 
Against that background Tomas’ breakdown (“I’m a victim too!”) 
has wider implications. Our cogito, our rationality, our control, our 
conventions are not really ours after all. We are victims too. But of 
what? That is the question. Our private little disasters are nothing 
but a premonition. 
The image from Ruben Östlund's film is reproduced with permission 
and assistance of Plattform Produktion.
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